Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_DB7C8DBF45C8
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending
Journal
Economica
Author(s)
Lind J. T., Rohner D.
ISSN
0013-0427
Publication state
Published
Issued date
12/06/2017
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
84
Number
336
Pages
611-646
Language
english
Abstract
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but richer voters are on average best informed. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, income is more important in affecting voting behaviour for more informed voters than for less informed voters. Further, when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.
Create date
19/06/2017 9:22
Last modification date
25/01/2020 7:10
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