Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending

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ID Serval
serval:BIB_DB7C8DBF45C8
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Knowledge is Power: A Theory of Information, Income and Welfare Spending
Périodique
Economica
Auteur(s)
Lind J. T., Rohner D.
ISSN
0013-0427
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
12/06/2017
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
84
Numéro
336
Pages
611-646
Langue
anglais
Résumé
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but richer voters are on average best informed. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, income is more important in affecting voting behaviour for more informed voters than for less informed voters. Further, when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.
Création de la notice
19/06/2017 10:22
Dernière modification de la notice
25/01/2020 8:10
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