A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_CE38321D346F
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
Journal
Mathematical Social Sciences
Author(s)
Ashlagi I., Karagozoglu E., Klaus B.
ISSN
0165-4896
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
63
Number
3
Pages
228-233
Language
english
Abstract
We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
Web of science
Create date
24/04/2012 13:20
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:48
Usage data