A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
Détails
ID Serval
serval:BIB_CE38321D346F
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
A non-cooperative support for equal division in estate division problems
Périodique
Mathematical Social Sciences
ISSN
0165-4896
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
63
Numéro
3
Pages
228-233
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We consider estate division problems and show that for any claim game based on a (estate division) rule satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and order preservation of awards, all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal division. Next, we consider (estate division) rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and claims monotonicity. Then, for claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
Web of science
Création de la notice
24/04/2012 13:20
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:48