Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_AC30912B68D5
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Author(s)
Klaus B., Klijn F.
ISSN
0899-8256
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
58
Number
1
Pages
154-171
Language
english
Abstract
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vale's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58, 1475-1480] result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets.
Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
Keywords
Matching, Couples, Stability, Random paths, Responsiveness
Web of science
Create date
13/04/2010 14:15
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:16
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