Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_AC30912B68D5
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Paths to Stability for Matching Markets with Couples
Périodique
Games and Economic Behavior
Auteur(s)
Klaus B., Klijn F.
ISSN
0899-8256
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
58
Numéro
1
Pages
154-171
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vale's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58, 1475-1480] result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets.
Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from 'satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.
Mots-clé
Matching, Couples, Stability, Random paths, Responsiveness
Web of science
Création de la notice
13/04/2010 14:15
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:16
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