Secure and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in Urban Areas

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_A9C304DA0E44
Type
Inproceedings: an article in a conference proceedings.
Collection
Publications
Title
Secure and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in Urban Areas
Title of the conference
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp)
Author(s)
Pham A., Huguenin K., Bilogrevic I., Hubaux J.-P.
Publisher
ACM
Address
Seattle, WA, United States
ISBN
978-1-4503-2968-2
Publication state
Published
Issued date
09/2014
Pages
751-762
Language
english
Abstract
Activity-based social networks, where people upload and share information about their location-based activities (e.g., the routes of their activities), are increasingly popular. Such systems, however, raise privacy and security issues: The service providers know the exact locations of their users; the users can report fake location information in order to, for example, unduly brag about their performance. In this paper, we propose a secure privacy-preserving system for reporting location-based activity summaries (e.g., the total distance covered and the elevation gain). Our solution is based on a combination of cryptographic techniques and geometric algorithms, and it relies on existing Wi-Fi access-point networks deployed in urban areas. We evaluate our solution by using real data sets from the FON community networks and from the Garmin Connect activity-based social network, and we show that it can achieve tight (up to a median accuracy of 76%) verifiable lower-bounds of the distance covered and of the elevation gain, while protecting the location privacy of the users with respect to both the social network operator and the access-point network operator(s).
Keywords
Location privacy, Social networks, Location proofs
Create date
01/11/2016 16:01
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:13
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