Secure and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in Urban Areas

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Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_A9C304DA0E44.P001.pdf (491.80 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur⸱e
ID Serval
serval:BIB_A9C304DA0E44
Type
Actes de conférence (partie): contribution originale à la littérature scientifique, publiée à l'occasion de conférences scientifiques, dans un ouvrage de compte-rendu (proceedings), ou dans l'édition spéciale d'un journal reconnu (conference proceedings).
Collection
Publications
Titre
Secure and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in Urban Areas
Titre de la conférence
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp)
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Pham A., Huguenin K., Bilogrevic I., Hubaux J.-P.
Editeur
ACM
Adresse
Seattle, WA, United States
ISBN
978-1-4503-2968-2
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
09/2014
Pages
751-762
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Activity-based social networks, where people upload and share information about their location-based activities (e.g., the routes of their activities), are increasingly popular. Such systems, however, raise privacy and security issues: The service providers know the exact locations of their users; the users can report fake location information in order to, for example, unduly brag about their performance. In this paper, we propose a secure privacy-preserving system for reporting location-based activity summaries (e.g., the total distance covered and the elevation gain). Our solution is based on a combination of cryptographic techniques and geometric algorithms, and it relies on existing Wi-Fi access-point networks deployed in urban areas. We evaluate our solution by using real data sets from the FON community networks and from the Garmin Connect activity-based social network, and we show that it can achieve tight (up to a median accuracy of 76%) verifiable lower-bounds of the distance covered and of the elevation gain, while protecting the location privacy of the users with respect to both the social network operator and the access-point network operator(s).
Mots-clé
Location privacy, Social networks, Location proofs
Création de la notice
01/11/2016 17:01
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 16:13
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