Executive Compensation and Stock Options: an Inconvenient Truth
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_9483121866E2
Type
Report: a report published by a school or other institution, usually numbered within a series.
Publication sub-type
Working paper: Working papers contain results presented by the author. Working papers aim to stimulate discussions between scientists with interested parties, they can also be the basis to publish articles in specialized journals
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Executive Compensation and Stock Options: an Inconvenient Truth
Institution details
CEPR - Centre for Economic Policy Research
Address
London, UK
Issued date
06/2008
Number
6890
Genre
Discussion paper
Language
english
Keywords
convex contracts, executive compensation, stock options, corporate governance, optimal contracting, business cycles
Publisher's website
Create date
30/04/2008 11:46
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:57
Usage data
