Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

Hodler, R.; Loertscher, S.; Rohner, D.

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.013

Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

Details

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Serval ID

serval:BIB_921BDAB6B826

Type

Article: article from journal or magazin.

Collection

Publications

Institution

UNIL/CHUV

Title

Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

Journal

Economics Letters

Author(s)

Hodler R., Loertscher S., Rohner D.

ISSN

0165-1765

Publication state

Published

Issued date

08/2014

Peer-reviewed

Oui

Volume

124

Number

Pages

195-198

Language

english

Abstract

We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision.We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert's preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.

Keywords

Persuasion, Costly signaling, Expert advice, Information distortion

OAI-PMH

oai:serval.unil.ch:BIB_921BDAB6B826

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2014.05.013

Web of science

000340320600008

Publisher's website

http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters/

Create date

05/08/2014 10:21