Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

Détails

Ressource 1Demande d'une copie Sous embargo indéterminé.
Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur
Licence: Non spécifiée
ID Serval
serval:BIB_921BDAB6B826
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
Périodique
Economics Letters
Auteur(s)
Hodler R., Loertscher S., Rohner D.
ISSN
0165-1765
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
08/2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
124
Numéro
2
Pages
195-198
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision.We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert's preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.
Mots-clé
Persuasion, Costly signaling, Expert advice, Information distortion
Web of science
Création de la notice
05/08/2014 11:21
Dernière modification de la notice
22/11/2019 7:16
Données d'usage