Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty

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State: Public
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Serval ID
serval:BIB_921BDAB6B826
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Persuasion, binary choice, and the costs of dishonesty
Journal
Economics Letters
Author(s)
Hodler R., Loertscher S., Rohner D.
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication state
Published
Issued date
08/2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
124
Number
2
Pages
195-198
Language
english
Abstract
We study the strategic interaction between a decision maker who needs to take a binary decision but is uncertain about relevant facts and an informed expert who can send a message to the decision maker but has a preference over the decision.We show that the probability that the expert can persuade the decision maker to take the expert's preferred decision is a hump-shaped function of his costs of sending dishonest messages.
Keywords
Persuasion, Costly signaling, Expert advice, Information distortion
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Create date
05/08/2014 11:21
Last modification date
22/11/2019 7:16
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