Incentives and Constraints for Mass Killings: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_6EEE1DF178D4
Type
A part of a book
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Incentives and Constraints for Mass Killings: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Title of the book
Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Preventions
Author(s)
Esteban J., Morelli M., Rohner D.
Publisher
Oxford University Press
ISBN
9780199378296
Publication state
Published
Issued date
07/2016
Editor
Anderton C. H., Brauer J.
Chapter
7
Pages
172-189
Language
english
Abstract
This chapter provides a rationalization of large-scale atrocities consistent with the main characteristics of the history of the last fifty years. Mass killings or genocides are planned; they are perpetrated by groups in power; they typically happen at the end of civil wars; they sometimes follow from external pressures or constraints on the group in power; the risk of mass killings is highest in polarized countries with low productivity and high dependence on natural resources. The normative implications in terms of third-party intervention have to be carefully considered. Neither a threat of direct intervention (effectively putting a cap on allowed mass killings) nor the imposition of minimum standards to be used for the treatment of defeated minorities can be evaluated in the absence of consideration of the economic structure and social divisions.
Keywords
Mass killings, Genocide, Civil war, Democratization, Intervention, Fairness
Create date
19/06/2017 9:14
Last modification date
21/08/2019 5:17
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