Incentives and Constraints for Mass Killings: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_6EEE1DF178D4
Type
Partie de livre
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Incentives and Constraints for Mass Killings: A Game-Theoretic Approach
Titre du livre
Economic Aspects of Genocides, Other Mass Atrocities, and Their Preventions
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Esteban J., Morelli M., Rohner D.
Editeur
Oxford University Press
ISBN
9780199378296
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
07/2016
Editeur⸱rice scientifique
Anderton C. H., Brauer J.
Numéro de chapitre
7
Pages
172-189
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This chapter provides a rationalization of large-scale atrocities consistent with the main characteristics of the history of the last fifty years. Mass killings or genocides are planned; they are perpetrated by groups in power; they typically happen at the end of civil wars; they sometimes follow from external pressures or constraints on the group in power; the risk of mass killings is highest in polarized countries with low productivity and high dependence on natural resources. The normative implications in terms of third-party intervention have to be carefully considered. Neither a threat of direct intervention (effectively putting a cap on allowed mass killings) nor the imposition of minimum standards to be used for the treatment of defeated minorities can be evaluated in the absence of consideration of the economic structure and social divisions.
Mots-clé
Mass killings, Genocide, Civil war, Democratization, Intervention, Fairness
Création de la notice
19/06/2017 9:14
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 5:17
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