Efficient Priority Rules

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_5D4965EC2E26
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Efficient Priority Rules
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
Author(s)
Ehlers L., Klaus B.
ISSN
0899-8256
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2006
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
55
Number
2
Pages
372-384
Language
english
Abstract
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Keywords
Acyclic priority structures, Deferred acceptance algorithm, Indivisible objects, Priority rules
Web of science
Create date
11/05/2010 14:14
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:15
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