Efficient Priority Rules

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_5D4965EC2E26
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Efficient Priority Rules
Périodique
Games and Economic Behavior
Auteur(s)
Ehlers L., Klaus B.
ISSN
0899-8256
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2006
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
55
Numéro
2
Pages
372-384
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study the assignment of indivisible objects with quotas (universities, jobs, or offices) to a set of agents (students, job applicants, or professors). Each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. We characterize efficient priority rules by efficiency, strategy-proofness, and reallocation-consistency. Such a rule respects an acyclic priority structure and the allocations are determined using the deferred acceptance algorithm.
Mots-clé
Acyclic priority structures, Deferred acceptance algorithm, Indivisible objects, Priority rules
Web of science
Création de la notice
11/05/2010 14:14
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:15
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