Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_5CE320AEE2E3
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics
Journal
The Journal of Finance
Author(s)
Morellec E., Nikolov B., Schuerhoff N.
ISSN
0022-1082
Publication state
Published
Issued date
06/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Number
3
Pages
803-848
Language
english
Abstract
We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms' equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low-leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.
Keywords
Managerial entrenchment, Financing policies, Structure choice, Growth options, Cross-section, Agency costs, Debt, Management, Tests, Risk
Web of science
Create date
19/11/2012 15:30
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:15
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