Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_5CE320AEE2E3
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Corporate Governance and Capital Structure Dynamics
Périodique
The Journal of Finance
Auteur(s)
Morellec E., Nikolov B., Schuerhoff N.
ISSN
0022-1082
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
06/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Numéro
3
Pages
803-848
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We develop a dynamic tradeoff model to examine the importance of manager-shareholder conflicts in capital structure choice. In the model, firms face taxation, refinancing costs, and liquidation costs. Managers own a fraction of the firms' equity, capture part of the free cash flow to equity as private benefits, and have control over financing decisions. Using data on leverage choices and the model's predictions for different statistical moments of leverage, we find that agency costs of 1.5% of equity value on average are sufficient to resolve the low-leverage puzzle and to explain the dynamics of leverage ratios. Our estimates also reveal that agency costs vary significantly across firms and correlate with commonly used proxies for corporate governance.
Mots-clé
Managerial entrenchment, Financing policies, Structure choice, Growth options, Cross-section, Agency costs, Debt, Management, Tests, Risk
Web of science
Création de la notice
19/11/2012 16:30
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:15
Données d'usage