Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or Managers?

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_51C3388B70A6
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or Managers?
Journal
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Author(s)
Andre P., Khalil S., Magnan M.
ISSN
0306-686X
Publication state
Published
Issued date
04/2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
34
Number
3-4
Pages
541-566
Language
english
Abstract
Institutional investors closely monitor termination fees in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We argue that their magnitude reflects either agency problems or efficiency considerations. Focusing on M&A involving Canadian targets between 1997 and 2004, we assess the determinants and market impact of termination fees. Our findings show that the Thomson's SDC Platinum (TM) Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database underestimates their extent. Results suggest that termination fees are essentially an efficient mechanism as they are relatively higher in M&A with high merger costs, a cash component and expected operating synergies. Stock market returns surrounding the deal announcement do not differ across levels of relative termination fees.
Keywords
Kill fees, Break fees, Termination fees, Mergers and acquisitions
Web of science
Create date
29/04/2016 17:19
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:07
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