Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or Managers?

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_51C3388B70A6
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Termination Fees in Mergers and Acquisitions: Protecting Investors or Managers?
Périodique
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting
Auteur(s)
Andre P., Khalil S., Magnan M.
ISSN
0306-686X
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
04/2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
34
Numéro
3-4
Pages
541-566
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Institutional investors closely monitor termination fees in mergers and acquisitions (M&A). We argue that their magnitude reflects either agency problems or efficiency considerations. Focusing on M&A involving Canadian targets between 1997 and 2004, we assess the determinants and market impact of termination fees. Our findings show that the Thomson's SDC Platinum (TM) Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions Database underestimates their extent. Results suggest that termination fees are essentially an efficient mechanism as they are relatively higher in M&A with high merger costs, a cash component and expected operating synergies. Stock market returns surrounding the deal announcement do not differ across levels of relative termination fees.
Mots-clé
Kill fees, Break fees, Termination fees, Mergers and acquisitions
Web of science
Création de la notice
29/04/2016 17:19
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:07
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