Theoretical Models of Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason

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Ressource 1Download: A178.16-GKLV-AdvCognNeurodyn5-185.pdf (235.11 [Ko])
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Serval ID
serval:BIB_23F4A6338B29
Type
A part of a book
Publication sub-type
Chapter: chapter ou part
Collection
Publications
Title
Theoretical Models of Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason
Title of the book
Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (V)
Author(s)
Guy T.V., Kárný M., Lintas A., Villa A.E.P.
Publisher
Springer Nature
ISBN
978-981-10-0205-2
978-981-10-0207-6
ISSN
2213-3569
2213-3577
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2016
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Editor
Wang R., Pan X.
Chapter
26
Pages
185-191
Language
english
Abstract
According to game theory, a human subject playing the ultimatum game should choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players (assumption of selfish rationality) (Rubinstein in J Econ Behav Organ 3(4):367–388, [1]). However, economy, sociology and neurology communities repeatedly claim non-rationality of the human behaviour (Werner et al. in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, [2]), following the observation that responders reject offers they find too low and proposers often offer more than the smallest amount, thus suggesting that humans’ behaviour is significantly influenced by social norms. We also assume human rationality, but our model describes a human responder via decision process with a reward function respecting fairness as much as the economic profit. This model is positively tested against a set of original experimental data, thus providing an insight into human’s motivation as a social being.
Create date
02/12/2016 18:48
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:01
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