Theoretical Models of Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason

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Ressource 1Télécharger: A178.16-GKLV-AdvCognNeurodyn5-185.pdf (235.11 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur⸱e
ID Serval
serval:BIB_23F4A6338B29
Type
Partie de livre
Sous-type
Chapitre: chapitre ou section
Collection
Publications
Titre
Theoretical Models of Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game: Fairness vs. Reason
Titre du livre
Advances in Cognitive Neurodynamics (V)
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Guy T.V., Kárný M., Lintas A., Villa A.E.P.
Editeur
Springer Nature
ISBN
978-981-10-0205-2
978-981-10-0207-6
ISSN
2213-3569
2213-3577
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2016
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Editeur⸱rice scientifique
Wang R., Pan X.
Numéro de chapitre
26
Pages
185-191
Langue
anglais
Résumé
According to game theory, a human subject playing the ultimatum game should choose more for oneself and offer the least amount possible for co-players (assumption of selfish rationality) (Rubinstein in J Econ Behav Organ 3(4):367–388, [1]). However, economy, sociology and neurology communities repeatedly claim non-rationality of the human behaviour (Werner et al. in Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton University Press, Princeton, [2]), following the observation that responders reject offers they find too low and proposers often offer more than the smallest amount, thus suggesting that humans’ behaviour is significantly influenced by social norms. We also assume human rationality, but our model describes a human responder via decision process with a reward function respecting fairness as much as the economic profit. This model is positively tested against a set of original experimental data, thus providing an insight into human’s motivation as a social being.
Création de la notice
02/12/2016 17:48
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:01
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