Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_F78B66E83226
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
Périodique
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Auteur(s)
Klaus B., Klijn F., Walzl M.
ISSN
1097-3923
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2011
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
13
Numéro
6
Pages
921-933
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present a roommate market without a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a roommate market with a nonsingleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2).
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Création de la notice
01/02/2011 10:12
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 22:50
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