The empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_DB1665D74503
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
The empirical assessment of agency accountability: A regime approach and an application to the German Bundesnetzagentur
Journal
International Review of Administrative Sciences
Author(s)
Biela J., Papadopoulos Y.
ISSN
0020-8523
Publication state
Published
Issued date
06/2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
80
Number
2
Pages
362-381
Language
english
Abstract
Regulation has in many cases been delegated to independent agencies, which has led to the question of how democratic accountability of these agencies is ensured. There are few empirical approaches to agency accountability. We offer such an approach, resting upon three propositions. First, we scrutinize agency accountability both de jure (accountability is ensured by formal rights of accountability 'fora' to receive information and impose consequences) and de facto (the capability of fora to use these rights depends on resources and decision costs that affect the credibility of their sanctioning capacity). Second, accountability must be evaluated separately at political, operational and managerial levels. And third, at each level accountability is enacted by a system of several (partially) interdependent fora, forming together an accountability regime. The proposed framework is applied to the case of the German Bundesnetzagentur's accountability regime, which shows its suitability for empirical purposes.
Regulatory agencies are often considered as independent, yet accountable. This article provides a realistic framework for the study of accountability 'regimes' in which they are embedded. It emphasizes the need to identify the various actors (accountability fora) to which agencies are formally accountable (parliamentary committees, auditing bodies, courts, and so on) and to consider possible relationships between them. It argues that formal accountability 'on paper', as defined in official documents, does not fully account for de facto accountability, which depends on the resources possessed by the fora (mainly information-processing and decision-making capacities) and the credibility of their sanctioning capacities. The article applies this framework to the German Bundesnetzagentur.
Keywords
accountability, costs, credibility, effectiveness, resources
Create date
02/03/2015 10:51
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:00
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