Coalitions and Compensation: The Case of Unemployment Benefit Duration

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_DAFFB7E3B286
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Coalitions and Compensation: The Case of Unemployment Benefit Duration
Périodique
Comparative Political Studies
Auteur(s)
Knotz Carlo, Lindvall Johannes
ISSN
0010-4140
1552-3829
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
04/2015
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
48
Numéro
5
Pages
586-615
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This paper examines unemployment benefit reforms in twenty-five advanced democracies between the middle of the 1980s and the onset of the Great Recession in 2008. The paper’s main argument is that the type of government – coalition or single-party – has an effect on whether cutbacks in social benefits are combined with compensating measures that mitigate the negative effects of the cuts. We show empirically that when cuts in unemployment benefit duration were made by coalition governments, spending on training programs tended to increase, but when cuts in duration were made by single-party governments, training spending tended to decrease. This pattern suggests that coalition governments, but not single-party governments, use compensation mechanisms to build political support for labor market reforms.
Mots-clé
labor market reform, coalition governments, retrenchment, compensation
Web of science
Création de la notice
25/03/2019 19:34
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 17:00
Données d'usage