The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_CB4265647E40
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness
Périodique
Social Choice and Welfare
Auteur(s)
Klaus B., Bochet O.
ISSN
0176-1714
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
01/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
40
Numéro
1
Pages
41-63
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller-Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new "Muller-Satterthwaite preference domains" (e.g., Proposition 3).
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
27/07/2011 15:04
Dernière modification de la notice
09/05/2019 1:17
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