Using auctions for contracting with hospitals when quality matters.

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_C6D16319FD6D
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Using auctions for contracting with hospitals when quality matters.
Périodique
International journal of health care finance and economics
Auteur(s)
Mougeot Michel, Naegelen Florence
ISSN
1389-6563
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2003
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
3
Numéro
1
Pages
5-23
Langue
anglais
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article ; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't - Publication Status: ppublish
Résumé
This paper analyzes the problem of contracting with hospitals with hidden information when the number of patients wanting treatment depends on the quality of health care services offered. The optimal policy is characterized in the case of a single hospital. It is demonstrated that the regulator can reduce the information rent by decreasing the quality. When the regulator is assumed to be able to organize an auction for awarding the right to provide the service, we characterize the optimal auction and the first score tendering procedure implementing it. The regulator can reimburse a unit price per treated patient and let the hospital choose the level of quality. It is proved that the expected quality of health care services is greater and the expected payment is lower than in the monopoly case.
Mots-clé
Competitive Bidding/economics, Competitive Bidding/methods, Efficiency, Organizational, France, Health Policy, Health Services Needs and Demand/economics, Hospital Administration/economics, Hospital Administration/standards, Hospital Costs, Humans, Models, Econometric, National Health Programs/economics, National Health Programs/standards, Quality Assurance, Health Care, Reimbursement, Incentive
Pubmed
Création de la notice
14/03/2008 11:20
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 21:18
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