Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_C530FF19DAED
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Production externe
Title
Bundling in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
Journal
Economics Letters
Author(s)
Klaus B., Dimitrov D., Haake C.-J.
ISSN
0165-1765
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2006
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
93
Number
1
Pages
106-110
Language
english
Abstract
We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents' preferences are additive, no such rule exists.
Keywords
Exchange markets, Indivisible goods, Bundling-proofness
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.045
Web of science
000241306800018
Create date
11/05/2010 15:20
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:40
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