Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_C308F75F908D
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Mutual trust and cooperation in the evolutionary hawks-doves game
Journal
BioSystems
Author(s)
Tomassini Marco, Pestelacci Enea, Luthi Leslie
ISSN
0303-2647
Publication state
Published
Issued date
01/2010
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
99
Number
1
Pages
50-59
Language
english
Abstract
Using a new dynamical network model of society in which pairwise interactions are weighted according to mutual satisfaction, we show that cooperation is the norm in the hawks-doves game when individuals are allowed to break ties with undesirable neighbors and to make new acquaintances in their extended neighborhood. Moreover, cooperation is robust with respect to rather strong strategy perturbations. We also discuss the empirical structure of the emerging networks, and the reasons that allow cooperators to thrive in the population. Given the metaphorical importance of this game for social interaction, this is an encouraging positive result as standard theory for large mixing populations prescribes that a certain fraction of defectors must always exist at equilibrium.
Keywords
Evolution of cooperation, Social networks, Community structure
Create date
27/04/2010 14:34
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:38
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