Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_C26383297FC2
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
Périodique
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
Auteur(s)
Kümmerli R., Burton-Chellew M.N., Ross-Gillespie A., West S.A.
ISSN
1091-6490[electronic], 0027-8424[linking]
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2010
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
107
Numéro
22
Pages
10125-10130
Langue
anglais
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article ; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Publication Status: ppublish
Résumé
The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment.
Mots-clé
Adolescent, Altruism, Competitive Behavior, Cooperative Behavior, Evolution, Female, Game Theory, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Models, Economic, Models, Psychological, Social Behavior, Young Adult
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
10/05/2010 21:40
Dernière modification de la notice
09/05/2019 0:49
Données d'usage