The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_B7E8A2A3FA43
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
The evolution of anti-social rewarding and its countermeasures in public goods games.
Périodique
Proceedings of the Royal Society. B Biological Sciences
Auteur(s)
dos Santos M.
ISSN
1471-2954 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
0962-8452
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2015
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
282
Numéro
1798
Pages
20141994
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Cooperation in joint enterprises can easily break down when self-interests are in conflict with collective benefits, causing a tragedy of the commons. In such social dilemmas, the possibility for contributors to invest in a common pool-rewards fund, which will be shared exclusively among contributors, can be powerful for averting the tragedy, as long as the second-order dilemma (i.e. withdrawing contribution to reward funds) can be overcome (e.g. with second-order sanctions). However, the present paper reveals the vulnerability of such pool-rewarding mechanisms to the presence of reward funds raised by defectors and shared among them (i.e. anti-social rewarding), as it causes a cooperation breakdown, even when second-order sanctions are possible. I demonstrate that escaping this social trap requires the additional condition that coalitions of defectors fare poorly compared with pro-socials, with either (i) better rewarding abilities for the latter or (ii) reward funds that are contingent upon the public good produced beforehand, allowing groups of contributors to invest more in reward funds than groups of defectors. These results suggest that the establishment of cooperation through a collective positive incentive mechanism is highly vulnerable to anti-social rewarding and requires additional countermeasures to act in combination with second-order sanctions.
Mots-clé
cooperation, pool rewards, evolutionary games, social dilemmas
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
21/10/2014 10:17
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:26
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