Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_B508EDB8F0C7
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Exposure to superfluous information reduces cooperation and increases antisocial punishment in reputation-based interactions
Périodique
Frontiers in Ecology and Evolution
Auteur(s)
dos Santos M., Braithwaite V.A., Wedekind C.
ISSN
2296-701X (electronic)
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
2
Pages
41
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Human cooperation is often based on reputation gained from previous interactions with third parties. Such reputation can be built on generous or punitive actions, and both, one's own reputation and the reputation of others have been shown to influence decision making in experimental games that control for confounding variables. Here we test how reputation-based cooperation and punishment react to disruption of the cognitive processing in different kinds of helping games with observers. Saying a few superfluous words before each interaction was used to possibly interfere with working memory. In a first set of experiments, where reputation could only be based on generosity, the disruption reduced the frequency of cooperation and lowered mean final payoffs. In a second set of experiments where reputation could only be based on punishment, the disruption increased the frequency of antisocial punishment (i.e. of punishing those who helped) and reduced the frequency of punishing defectors. Our findings suggest that working memory can easily be constraining in reputation-based interactions within experimental games, even if these games are based on a few simple rules with a visual display that provides all the information the subjects need to play the strategies predicted from current theory. Our findings also highlight a weakness of experimental games, namely that they can be very sensitive to environmental variation and that quantitative conclusions about antisocial punishment or other behavioral strategies can easily be misleading.
Mots-clé
indirect reciprocity, game theory, experimental games, image score, punishment reputation, sanctions, cognitive constraints, helping behavior
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
11/07/2014 15:56
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:23
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