The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second Best Incentive Compatible

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_A60B86C9A2BB
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
The Coordinate-Wise Core for Multiple-Type Housing Markets is Second Best Incentive Compatible
Journal
Journal of Mathematical Economics
Author(s)
Klaus B.
ISSN
0304-4068
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
44
Number
9-10
Pages
919-924
Language
english
Abstract
We consider the generalization of Shapley and Scarf's (1974) [Shapley, L., Scarf's, H., 1974. On cores and indivisibility. Journal of Mathematical Economics 1, 23-37.] model of trading indivisible objects (houses) to so-called multiple-type housing markets. We show that the prominent solution for these markets, the coordinate-wise core rule, is second-best incentive compatible.
Keywords
Coordinate-wise core, Indivisible goods, Second-best incentive compatibility, Strategy-proofness
Web of science
Create date
13/04/2010 14:06
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:11
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