Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets

Détails

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Etat: Serval
Version: de l'auteur
ID Serval
serval:BIB_A2B064543BF8
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Making Sense of the Experimental Evidence on Endogenous Timing in Duopoly Markets
Périodique
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Auteur(s)
Santos Pinto L.
ISSN
0167-2681
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
12/2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
68
Numéro
3-4
Pages
657-666
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to find support for it. In contrast, these experiments find that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous. This paper generalizes Hamilton and Slutsky's (Hamilton, J., Slutsky, S., 1990. Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or Cournot equilibria. Games and Economic Behavior 2, 29-46) endogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in payoffs. I explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and compare them to the empirical evidence. I find that this explanation is able to organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. However, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky's endogenous timing games.
Mots-clé
Endogenous timing, Cournot, Stackelberg, Inequity aversion
Web of science
Création de la notice
01/12/2008 22:32
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 20:10
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