Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_9DBFE7A01506
Type
A part of a book
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Rules of Origin as Export Subsidies
Title of the book
The Origin of Goods: Rules of Origin in Regional Trade Agreements
Publisher
Oxford University Press, CEPR
ISBN
9780199290482
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2006
Editor
Cadot O., Estevadeordal A., Suwa-Eisenmann A., Verdier T.
Pages
149-172
Language
english
Abstract
This chapter estimates the effect of NAFTA’s rules of origin (ROO) on Mexican access to the US market, treating ROO as politically-determined. Econometric estimates of bilateral disaggrated trade, with tariff preference and endogenous ROO as determinants, suggest that the creation of a captive market for upstream US intermediate-good producers is indeed one of the political determinants of NAFTA.
Keywords
NAFTA, Rules of origin, Endogenous protection, Political economy, Free trade agreements, Regionalism
Create date
19/11/2007 10:42
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:04
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