Why Resource Regimes Fail in the Long Run? The Role of Institutional Complexity Traps and Transversal Transaction Costs

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_99B56511223B
Type
Autre: (aucun autre type ne convient)
Collection
Publications
Titre
Why Resource Regimes Fail in the Long Run? The Role of Institutional Complexity Traps and Transversal Transaction Costs
Auteur(s)
Bolognesi Thomas, Nahrath Stéphane
ISSN
1556-5068
Date de publication
13/06/2017
Langue
anglais
Notes
SSRN Papers
Résumé
The Institutional Resource Regime framework is a realistic approach of the socio-ecological systems governance and sustainability, which is based on the combination of public policies analysis and institutional economics. If the effects identified by the framework have been confirmed, there is no clear understanding of the institutional mechanisms at work. The integration of a dynamic perspective provides the framework with tools capable of defining the workings of governance and extends its relevance to policy forecasting or specification. To do so, we propose to use concepts belonging to New Institutional Economics. Our research question is how changes in the characteristics of an Institutional Resource Regime contribute to improving the sustainability potential of a Socio-Ecological System. The paper provides an original analysis of environmental governance and transaction costs, which results in three generic theoretical propositions.
Création de la notice
14/04/2018 13:09
Dernière modification de la notice
10/10/2019 5:10
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