The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities

Détails

Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_957B93C0F664.P001.pdf (218.26 [Ko])
Etat: Serval
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
ID Serval
serval:BIB_957B93C0F664
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
The political economy of international regulatory convergence in public utilities
Périodique
International Journal of Management and Network Economics
Auteur(s)
Bonardi J.-P., Urbiztondo S., Quélin B.
ISSN
1754-2324 (Online)
1754-2316 (Print)
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2009
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
1
Numéro
2
Pages
232-256
Langue
anglais
Résumé
To what extent should public utilities regulation be expected to converge across countries? When it occurs, will it generate good outcomes? Building on the core proposition of the New Institutional Economics that similar regulations generate different outcomes depending on their fit with the underlying domestic institutions, we develop a simple model and explore its implications by examining the diffusion of local loop unbundling (LLU) regulations. We argue that: one should expect some convergence in public utility regulation but with still a significant degree of local experimentation; this process will have very different impacts of regulation.
Mots-clé
Regulatory convergence, Telecommunications, Unbundling regulations, Political economy, Public utilities, Public utility regulation, Regulation impacts, Local impact
Création de la notice
17/09/2008 23:32
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 19:40
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