A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_8BA1B5A58883
Type
Unpublished: a document having an author and title, but not formally published.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
A Noncooperative Support for Equal Division in Estate Division Problems
Issued date
2008
Language
english
Notes
Harvard Business School NOM Working Paper No. 09-069
Abstract
We consider estate division problems, a generalization of bankruptcy problems. We show that in
a direct revelation claim game, if the underlying division rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment
of equals, and weak order preservation, then all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal
division. Next, we consider division rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and
claims monotonicity. For claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria
induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than
three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
a direct revelation claim game, if the underlying division rule satisfies efficiency, equal treatment
of equals, and weak order preservation, then all (pure strategy) Nash equilibria induce equal
division. Next, we consider division rules satisfying efficiency, equal treatment of equals, and
claims monotonicity. For claim games with at most three agents, again all Nash equilibria
induce equal division. Surprisingly, this result does not extend to claim games with more than
three agents. However, if nonbossiness is added, then equal division is restored.
Keywords
Bankruptcy/estate division problems, claims monotonicity, direct revelation claim game, equal division, equal treatment of equals, Nash equilibria, nonbossiness, (weak) order preservation.
Open Access
Yes
Create date
05/05/2022 11:15
Last modification date
06/05/2022 5:34
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