Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_83807F06BFD3
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Tacit Collusion under Fairness and Reciprocity
Périodique
Games
Auteur(s)
Iris D., Santos-Pinto L.
ISSN
2073-4336
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
02/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
4
Numéro
1
Pages
50-65
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This paper departs from the standard profit-maximizing model of firm behavior by assuming that firms are motivated in part by personal animosity-or respect-towards their competitors. A reciprocal firm responds to unkind behavior of rivals with unkind actions (negative reciprocity), while at the same time, it responds to kind behavior of rivals with kind actions (positive reciprocity). We find that collusion is easier to sustain when firms have a concern for reciprocity towards competing firms provided that they consider collusive prices to be kind and punishment prices to be unkind. Thus, reciprocity concerns among firms can have adverse welfare consequences for consumers.
Mots-clé
Fairness, Reciprocity, Collusion, Repeated games
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
07/02/2014 13:22
Dernière modification de la notice
08/05/2019 21:16
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