Why Taxing Executives' Bonuses Can Foster Risk-Taking Behavior

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Version: Final published version
License: All rights reserved
Serval ID
serval:BIB_7F25D208D20A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Production externe
Title
Why Taxing Executives' Bonuses Can Foster Risk-Taking Behavior
Journal
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics
Author(s)
Grossmann Martin, Dietl Helmut, Lang Markus
ISSN
0932-4569
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2016
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
172
Number
4
Pages
645
Language
english
Keywords
Economics and Econometrics
DOI
10.1628/093245616x14689190842778
Web of science
000387395200004
Create date
27/08/2019 13:27
Last modification date
27/09/2021 7:59
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