Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_7644
Type
Report: a report published by a school or other institution, usually numbered within a series.
Publication sub-type
Working paper: Working papers contain results presented by the author. Working papers aim to stimulate discussions between scientists with interested parties, they can also be the basis to publish articles in specialized journals
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Asymmetric Information, Bank Lending and Implicit Contracts : The Winner's Curse
Institution details
Université de Lausanne - HEC - DEEP
Issued date
05/1998
Number
98.09
Genre
Cahiers de recherches économiques
Language
english
OAI-PMH
Create date
19/11/2007 11:34
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:33
Usage data
