Article: article from journal or magazin.
Strategy-Proofness and Population-Monotonicity for House Allocation Problems
Journal of Mathematical Economics
We study a simple model of assigning indivisible objects to agents, such as dorm rooms to students, or offices to professors, where each agent receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not possible. For these problems population-monotonicity, which requires that agents are affected by population changes in the same way, is a compelling property because tentative assignments are made in many typical situations, which may have to be revised later to take into account the changing population. We completely describe the allocation rules satisfying population-monotonicity, strategy-proofness, and efficiency. The characterized rules assign the objects by an iterative procedure in which at each step no more than two agents "trade" objects from their hierarchically specified "endowments."
Indivisible objects, Strategy-proofness, Population-monotonicity
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