Agency Conflicts around the World

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_69820D83F4A6
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Agency Conflicts around the World
Périodique
The Review of Financial Studies
Auteur(s)
Morellec E., Nikolov B., Schürhoff N.
ISSN
0893-9454
1465-7368
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
01/11/2018
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
31
Numéro
11
Pages
4232-4287
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs.
Mots-clé
Economics and Econometrics, Accounting, Finance
Web of science
Création de la notice
28/10/2016 17:31
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 6:16
Données d'usage