Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups

Détails

Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_692453B9B556.P001.pdf (5334.48 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
ID Serval
serval:BIB_692453B9B556
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Reputation based on punishment rather than generosity allows for evolution of cooperation in sizable groups
Périodique
Evolution and Human Behavior
Auteur(s)
dos Santos M., Wedekind C.
ISSN
1090-5138
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2015
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
36
Numéro
1
Pages
59-64
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Cooperation among unrelated individuals can arise if decisions to help others can be based on reputation. While working for dyadic interactions, reputation-use in social dilemmas involving many individuals (e.g. public goods games) becomes increasingly difficult as groups become larger and errors more frequent. Reputation is therefore believed to have played a minor role for the evolution of cooperation in collective action dilemmas such as those faced by early humans. Here, we show in computer simulations that a reputation system based on punitive actions can overcome these problems and, compared to reputation system based on generous actions, (i) is more likely to lead to the evolution of cooperation in sizable groups, (ii) more effectively sustains cooperation within larger groups, and (iii) is more robust to errors in reputation assessment. Punishment and punishment reputation could therefore have played crucial roles in the evolution of cooperation within larger groups of humans.
Mots-clé
Game theory, Public goods game, Collective action dilemmas, Reputation, Punishment, Indirect reciprocity
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
01/09/2014 19:22
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:24
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