Self-Reinforcing Market Dominance
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_5D1007F27382
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Self-Reinforcing Market Dominance
Journal
Games and Economic Behavior
ISSN
0899-8256
Publication state
Published
Issued date
11/2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Number
2
Pages
481-502
Language
english
Abstract
Are initial competitive advantages self-reinforcing, so that markets exhibit an endogenous tendency to be dominated by only a few firms? Although this question is of great economic importance, no systematic empirical study has yet addressed it. Therefore, we examine experimentally whether firms with an initial cost advantage are more likely to invest in marginal cost reductions than firms with higher initial costs. We find that the initial competitive advantages are indeed self-reinforcing, but subjects in the role of firms overinvest relative to the Nash equilibrium. However, the pattern of overinvestment even strengthens the tendency towards self-reinforcing cost advantages relative to the theoretical prediction. Further, as predicted by the Nash equilibrium, mean-preserving spreads of the initial cost distribution have no effects on aggregate investments. Finally, investment spillovers reduce investment, and investment is higher than the joint-profit maximizing benchmark for the case without spillovers and lower for the case with spillovers.
Keywords
Cost-reducing investment, Asymmetric oligopoly, Increasing dominance, Experimental study
Web of science
Create date
10/08/2009 12:12
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:15