Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_50439C0C3B12
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment
Périodique
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Auteur(s)
Burks S., Carpenter J., Goette L.
ISSN
0167-2681
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2009
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
70
Numéro
3
Pages
458 - 469
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We report the results of an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Second-mover behavior in our sequential prisoner's dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those at firms that pay hourly wages or who are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S.
Mots-clé
Field experiment, Social preferences, Compensation schemes, Sorting
Web of science
Création de la notice
10/08/2009 13:52
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 17:08
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