Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

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Ressource 1Télécharger: 23888865postscript.pdf (496.58 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
ID Serval
serval:BIB_4CFB645F4F65
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.
Périodique
Evolution
Auteur(s)
dos Santos M., Rankin D.J., Wedekind C.
ISSN
1558-5646 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
0014-3820
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Numéro
8
Pages
2446-2450
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.
Mots-clé
Experimental game theory, indirect reciprocity, punishment
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
21/02/2013 9:05
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:01
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