Analyst forecasts, corporate governance and firm performance

Détails

Demande d'une copie
ID Serval
serval:BIB_43037
Type
Thèse: thèse de doctorat.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Analyst forecasts, corporate governance and firm performance
Auteur(s)
Kast M.
Directeur(s)
Von Thadden E.-L.
Editeur
[s.n.]
Détails de l'institution
Université de Lausanne, Faculté des hautes études commerciales
Adresse
Lausanne
Statut éditorial
Acceptée
Date de publication
2004
Langue
anglais
Notes
REROID:R003736801; 30 cm; 1 vol. (pagination multiple); Old school value: Université de Lausanne
Résumé
Abstract
Using a new data set of small public firms in Germany, this paper analyzes the incentive and entrenchment effects associated with managerial equity ownership. The relationship between firm value and insider ownership is found to be nonlinear: at low levels of ownership firm value is positively related to managerial holdings, whereas the relation is negative for higher levels of ownership. Disentangling cash flow and voting rights of managing directors, firm value increases with cash flow ownership of top management but decreases with control, in particular with management voting rights in excess of 25%. Outside blockholders do not appear to play a role in disciplining managements. Codetermination does not affect the value of small firms.
Mots-clé
corporate governance, ownership structure, managerial incentives
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 11:23
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:46
Données d'usage