Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and Poor Countries

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_2B90AD76B066
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and Poor Countries
Périodique
World Bank Economic Review
Auteur(s)
Cadot O., De Melo J., Olarreaga M.
ISSN
0258-6770
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2004
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
18
Numéro
3
Pages
345-366
Langue
anglais
Résumé
A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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Création de la notice
19/11/2007 10:57
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 15:25
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