More Power to You? A Case Against Binding Decisions as the Ultimate Access to Information Enforcement Tool

Détails

Ressource 1Télécharger: 0095399715611171.pdf (230.65 [Ko])
Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur
Licence: Non spécifiée
ID Serval
serval:BIB_1B1D26C6873C
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
More Power to You? A Case Against Binding Decisions as the Ultimate Access to Information Enforcement Tool
Périodique
Administration & Society
Auteur(s)
Holsen Sarah, Pasquier Martial
ISSN
0095-3997
1552-3039
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2019
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
Volume 58
Numéro
Issue 1
Pages
34-62
Langue
anglais
Résumé
The enforcement of Access to Information laws is crucial to their effectiveness. Information commissioners, who enforce about one quarter of federal policies, are granted powers to help them execute their tasks. Many scholars argue that a commissioner should have the right to issue legally binding orders. However, we found that a commissioner with recommendation power is not necessarily less effective. This article argues that one must consider what binding decision power really means, whether the body uses it, and how the body uses its other powers and fulfills its tasks before declaring that binding decision power is the ultimate enforcement tool.
Mots-clé
Transparency, Access to Information, Information Commissioner
Création de la notice
01/08/2018 12:44
Dernière modification de la notice
06/11/2019 8:08
Données d'usage